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The use of Export Processing Zones (EPZs)1 as a policy for trade and
economic development has exponentially grown in the past decades,
particularly in developing countries. In 1986, the International Labour1 When discussing EPZs, a variety of terminologies, such as Industrial Free Zones, Free
Trade Zones, Special Economic Zones and Maquiladoras are used interchangeably in the
literature. Although each has their own particularity, wewill consider the broad deﬁnition
of thembeing “demarcatedgeographic areas containedwithin a country's national bound-
aries where the rules of business are different from those that prevail in the national ter-
ritory. These differential rules principally deal with investment conditions, international
trade and customs, taxation, and the regulatory environment; whereby the zone is given
a business environment that is intended to be more liberal from a policy perspective
and more effective from an administrative perspective than that of the national territory”
(Farole and Akinci, 2011:23).
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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By 2008, the number reached more than 3000 zones in 135 countries,
accounting for over 40 million direct jobs and over US$200 billion in
global exports (Farole and Akinci, 2011). Despite the importance of
the phenomenon, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence for
evaluating these programmes in the context of developing countries.2
Further, the focus has remained on aggregate and traditional outcomes
(FDI, exports, ﬁrm dynamics), and little attention has been paid to
understanding the welfare and distributional effects resulting from the
establishment of EPZs.
Toﬁll this gap this study takes advantage of the gradual establishment
of EPZs in Nicaraguan municipalities during the period 1993–2009 to as-
sess the average effect and the distributional pattern of this spatially-
boundpolicywithin the hostmunicipalities. Nicaragua provides an excel-
lent setting to study this phenomenon. The number of ﬁrms operating
under the regime has increased markedly since its inception in the
early 1990s, acrossmore than 20 of the 153municipalities of the country.
By 2010, EPZs accounted for 50% of total exports, and nearly 90% of
manufacturing exports. The government considers that in the same
year, EPZs jobs represented 25% of total formal work across the country,
with on average ﬁrms directly employing around 7.5% of the total labour
force of the municipalities where they locate.3 Yet, no empirical assess-
ment exists.
While having awider reach than traditional place-based policies (i.e.
diversify exports, increase FDI), EPZ programmes are prone to have a
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the local economies (Wang, 2013) as they oper-
ate with incentives to hire and create economic activity in or near the
areas where they locate fostering agglomeration economies (Combes
et al., 2010). In this sense, local welfare effects might differ substantially
from those at the aggregate level, particularly in cases with labour mar-
ket frictions. Labourmobility and land-price responsesmay be such that
the jobs created go to non-poor residents and that the gains from land
prices beneﬁt higher-income segments (Neumark and Simpson,
2014). As stressed by Kline and Moretti (2014) and shown by
Reynolds and Rohlin (2015) for the case of US federal empowerment
zones, positive average effects of spatially-tied policies can mask signif-
icant disparities in terms of the actual beneﬁciaries across the income
distribution in treated areas. There are heterogeneous effects according
to whether individuals are homeowners or renters, or more generally
by skill and initial income levels, that are not necessarily captured by
looking at the average effect on local wages (Neumark and Simpson,
2014). In this sense, disentangling in what way the establishment of
an EPZ proﬁts the different segments of the income distribution within
concerned areas helps to shed light on themechanisms of the policy and
ultimate local beneﬁciaries. The question is of great policy relevance in
developing economies with already large levels of overall income
disparities.
For the analysis here, I exploit a repeated cross-sectional dataset
based on ofﬁcial household surveys and construct a unique
municipal-level panel that allows for the examination of different
moments of the expenditure distribution before and after the policy
implementation. By focusing on the aggregate outcomes at the mu-
nicipal level and on household per capita expenditures, the study
captures general equilibrium effects of EPZ establishment within a
locality.4 The identiﬁcation strategy is straightforward. I use both
the time and cross-section variation of zones' establishment across
municipalities to estimate their average effect on the levels of real2 Aside notable exceptions, the literature is limited to case studies andmacro-economic
reviews. See Farole and Akinci, 2011; Engman et al., 2007; Aggarwal, 2006 and Glick and
Roubaud, 2006, for recent examples.
3 Data obtained from the Comisión Nacional de Zonas Francas (CNZF) and Nicaragua's
Central Bank (BCN).
4 In the absence of disaggregated property prices andﬁrm-level data, using expenditure
data remains the best strategy to capture the net effect of EPZ establishment. A similar
strategy was used by Topalova (2010) to measure the local effect of trade liberalization
within Indian districts.expenditure per capita of working age individuals, and across all
the deciles of the expenditure distribution in treated municipalities.
In themain approach, I use a difference-in-differences (DID) strategy
extended to quantiles (Athey and Imbens, 2006). An important fea-
ture of the overall empirical strategy needs to be emphasized. The
approach does not aim at measuring the impact of the EPZ policy
on inequality across Nicaragua as a whole. Rather, it looks at the
question of knowing whether within municipalities exposed to the
establishment of EPZs, certain segments of the distribution capture
more or less of the resulting gains or losses.
This analysis builds on two complementary bodies of research.
Mostly, it borrows from the large literature that has looked at evaluating
place-based programmes in the US and Europe (Busso et al., 2013;
Neumark and Kolko, 2010), and adds to the nascent counterpart study-
ing the impact of EPZ policies at the subnational level in developing
countries. Findings in these papers are revealing of the extent to
which local economies are inﬂuenced by the establishment of an
exporting zone. Using employment data and census statistics on
educational outcomes at the municipal-level for Mexico, Atkin (2012)
ﬁnds an increase in school dropouts in concerned municipalities
following the arrival of new better-paying export jobs. Similar in strate-
gy to this paper, Wang (2013) shows that Chinese Special Economic
Zones (SEZ) beneﬁt local economies through higher levels and growth
rates of per capita FDI and total factor productivity (TFP), as well as
higher average wages that compensate any increase in the local cost
of living. Additionally, this paper adds empirical evidence to the
literature analysing the effects of trade policies on local labour markets
in developing countries. This area of research has emphasized the
importance of understanding the impact of trade policies at the local
level, particularly in cases of limited factor mobility (see Goldberg and
Pavcnik, 2007 for an extensive review).
The validity of my ﬁndings rely on the assumption that the different
empirical methods successfully account for the underlying differences
in municipalities' characteristics that are likely to explain the non-
random choice of EPZs location across time and space. In the absence
of a credible instrument, I take care of unobservable confounders by
allowing for time and municipalities ﬁxed-effects across speciﬁcations.
I also include province and region-time dummies to control in a ﬂexible
manner for the fact that EPZs concentrate in the western part of the
country. Further, I use information on accessibility and socio-economic
indicators to build alternative sets of control municipalities that are
likely to be more meaningful comparable groups under the DID setting.
My preferred control group is balanced on covariates and pre-treatment
trends of outcomes, and the assumption of parallel trends of main
outcomes holds.
Further threats to validity concern possible spillover dynamics and
the relocation of individuals across treated and control areas. I address
these concerns in several ways. First, I test for the existence of spillovers
on the outcomes variables of neighbouring areas using varying degrees
of distance. I ﬁnd no evidence supporting large ﬁrm relocations or com-
muting ﬂows. This is consistent with the literature registering small
backward linkages generated by EPZ policies, and the low commuting
of the Nicaraguan labour force (Jansen et al., 2007). The potential threat
from labour mobility is harder to address. There are two dimensions to
consider: in and out-migration. Both may have compositional effects
that may alter ﬁrms location decisions (related on skills and local
wages effects) as well as outcomes. Reassuringly, I ﬁnd no evidence of
large population readjustments across municipalities when measuring
the effect of the policy on the likelihood of migrating for the working-
age sample. Results are also unchanged when adding baseline popula-
tion weights. Although, I ﬁnd evidence of compositional changes
towards an increase in the share of the high-to-low skill ratios in treated
municipalities, the size is too small to challenge the identiﬁcation
validity, and if anything, contributes to elucidating the mechanisms of
the policy. Finally, the results are also robustwhen excluding the capital
city and municipality of Managua.
5 Because I do not have access to ﬁrm-level data (workers, exports, sales or value-
added), I cannot corroborate or disentangle EPZ categories with a continuous treatment
variable. Any attempt to categorize EPZs in terms of intensitywould likely bemisspeciﬁed.
6 I compiled information on EPZs location by the end of each year, origin and sector of
operation from the CNZF annual yearbooks. When possible, I cross-checked the informa-
tion with the EPZ website proﬁle. See Appendix II for more details.
7 The discrepancy with the ofﬁcial ﬁgure of +150 stems from this deﬁnition, as I count
industrial parks as one irrespective of the quantity of ﬁrms. Since the launch of the pro-
gramme, by this deﬁnition, the number of EPZs increased from 1 in 1993 to 64 (+150)
in 2009.
8 There are 153 municipalities, 15 provinces and 2 autonomous regions in Nicaragua.
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distributional dynamics of EPZ policies at the local level. First, I conﬁrm
that there is a positive average treatment effect on the levels of real per
capita expenditure in treatedmunicipalities. Themagnitude is small but
non- negligible, with an average 10 to 12% increase in treated areas for
the entire period. Second, I ﬁnd that the mean effect hides signiﬁcant
disparities across the distribution. Results offer suggestive evidence
that those at the upper-tail of the distribution are themain beneﬁciaries
of the policy over the period covered. This effect is incremental with the
more years of EPZ operation. The impact is heterogeneous in time for
the remaining segments, signiﬁcant at middle-range deciles after eight
years of an EPZ establishment. These results are consistent with the
existence of a skill-premium in the exporting sector thatmay be altering
the cost of living (i.e. land price responses) in proﬁt of the higher-skill/
higher-income segments. Indeed, I ﬁnd that the average positive gains
are concentrated in the high-skill working-age group.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the EPZ programme in Nicaragua. Section 3 introduces and
examines the data, and Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy.
Results are discussed in Section 5, with extensions and robustness
checks shown in Section 6. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2. Nicaragua's export processing zone programme
2.1. Ley de Zona Franca: legal procedures & tax exemptions
Resembling analogous initiatives, Nicaragua's EPZ regime (‘Zonas
Francas’) was put in place with the aim of generating employment,
attracting FDI, increasing non-traditional exports, acquiring new
technologies and expanding international trade. The programme is
relatively young compared to other Central American countries as an
earlier initiative was abandoned for a decade during the civil conﬂict
(1979–1990) and was only reintroduced following the shift to
democracy and the market economy in 1990. In 1991, Decree N.46–91
formally established the existing regime, with the appropriate regula-
tion passed in the following year (Decree N. 31–92). Together, these
two decrees created the legal framework concerning the organization
of EPZs, the ﬁscal incentives, the rights and obligations of operators
and users, as well as the regulatory body in the form of the National
Commission of Free Trade Zones (CNZF). The law was amended over
the years, with its most notable reform aimed at simplifying procedures
taking place in 2005 (Decree N. 50–2005).
Under the Nicaraguan legislation, EPZ status is granted to foreign or
national private ﬁrms oriented towards the export of goods and services
that meet a certain array of criteria and follow the ofﬁcial procedures
with the CNZF. There have been many efforts to expedite the legal pro-
cess of application in the recent years (i.e. establishment of a one-stop
shop after 2005). Firms applying to be recognized under the EPZ regime
need to provide detailed information of their project (which includes
ﬁnancial plans, market analysis, exporting markets, construction or
building agreements, estimates of job creation, among others). They
also need to comply with environmental, building and health
regulations, and the project must be approved by the mayoral ofﬁce in
the municipality where they intend to locate. There is no explicit rule
regarding the age of the ﬁrm (new or pre-existing).
Following standard practice, the programme is based on attracting
and generating business by offering particular tax incentives to qualify-
ing ﬁrms. These include the full exemption from payment of (1) Income
Tax during the ﬁrst ten years of operation (and 60% from the eleventh
year onwards); (2) all taxes and custom duties of machinery,
equipment and intermediate goods, as well as of transportation and
support services for the zones (including for instance equipment need-
ed for installation of health care or child care); (3) indirect taxes, taxes
on selective sales or consumption; (4) export taxes on processed
products made within the regime; (5) municipal taxes on property
sales, including the tax on capital gains if any; and (6) municipaltaxes. The regime also includes the unrestricted repatriation of capital.
In exchange, ﬁrms have to pay an annual fee to the CNZF, determined
according to the industrial sector and sq. metres of occupied area.
Under Nicaraguan law, EPZs are allowed to sell intermediate goods
and inputs to other exporting ﬁrms in the country, provided they pay
custom duties. However, EPZs are strictly forbidden from selling ﬁnal
goods in the local market. The legislation also provides conditions
under which EPZ developers may beneﬁt from tax exemptions, as well
as the possibility for them to subcontract to local Nicaraguan ﬁrms
which are then exempted from VAT payment. The restriction to sell in
the local market and the barriers to sell intermediate inputs means
that in terms of production the larger effect of EPZs is contained to the
exporting sector, without hampering local producers. The possibility
to outsource to local providers creates some incentives to generate
backward linkages, and any ﬁrm relocation or diversion is likely to
happen through this indirectmechanism. I expect these to be low. Back-
ward linkages with local ﬁrms have been found to be very low in Latin
America (Jenkins et al., 1998). The share of domestic expenditures as a
share of total value of EPZ exports in Nicaragua has ranged between
25 to 30%, with wages constituting the bulk of the shares (ECLAC,
2012). I formally address this issue in Section 6.1.
Nicaraguan labour laws regulate work in EPZs and minimal wages
have been in place since 1999. The country has the lowest manufactur-
ing wages in the region, which is a source of its comparative advantage.
Still, minimum wages in EPZs have traditionally been higher than the
overall manufacturing and agricultural sectors throughout the period
(20 to 70% higher on average per year).2.2. Deﬁnition & characterization of EPZs
The law distinguishes three different categories: administrators (in-
dustrial park operators), users (situated within industrial parks) and
‘single-factory’ EPZs. The distinction is relatively artiﬁcial. Operators
and users of industrial parks operate in the same area, with the former
only providing a service to the using ﬁrms and most of time owning
some ﬁrms within the park. The distinction serves administrative
purposes for the payment of different types of fees to the CNZF. Further,
the single-factory category is mostly used by large multinational
corporations with a wide range of functions. Examples of these are
New Holland Apparel, a large US manufacturing ﬁrm that produces
sportswear for Nike, or Yazaki, a Korean ﬁrm in the area of light
manufacturing considered to be the single largest employer in the
country. Each of these ﬁrms employs about 2 to 8 thousands workers,
respectively (2013). In this sense, despite the different legal deﬁnitions,
industrial parksmade of smaller ﬁrms are thus essentially equivalent in
terms of employment and export volume to stand-along EPZ ﬁrms. As
such, I do not distinguish between the different categories.5 For the
empirical analysis, I deﬁne EPZs as stand-alone ﬁrms or an industrial
park hosting one or more ﬁrms, and reported by the CNZF at year
end.6 By this deﬁnition, the total number of EPZs in my sample is 64
by 2009,7 located in 20 different municipalities across 10 provinces.8
Fig. 1 depicts the pattern of localization across municipalities according
to the sequence of establishment.
In terms of numbers of ﬁrms and parks, a larger share is concentrat-
ed in the capital city Managua (37%), the adjacent provinces of Masaya
Fig. 1.Gradual establishment of EPZs inNicaraguanMunicipalities (1993–2009).Notes: GIS digitalmaps.Municipalities are highlighted following the establishment of an industrial park or
single factory under the EPZ regime.During the period considered somemunicipalitiesmay containmore than oneﬁrmor industrial park. Datawas compiled from the annual yearbooks of
the Comision Nacional de Zonas Francas (CNZF).
321N. Picarelli / Labour Economics 41 (2016) 318–332and Carazo (20%), and the north-eastern provinces of Estelí and
Chinandega (18%). These provinces also represent 55% of the countries'
total population (2012). 76% of EPZs are foreign, the majority of which
(40%) are from the US, followed by South Korea (22%). According to
ofﬁcial statistics for 2010 (CNZF), American EPZs employed 35% of the
total workforce in the sector, followed by South Korean which
employed about 30%. Nicaraguan EPZs are attributed only 5% of the
workforce in the sector, which implies little ﬁrm relocation from
previously operating ﬁrms. There is no disaggregated statistics on the
number of employees within each EPZs. According to the World Bank
Enterprise Surveys, only 12% of domestic ﬁrms exported in 2010. Near
to 90% of these EPZs operate in the manufacturing sector, with a
predominance of ﬁrms producing textile, apparel and light electronics,
followed by cigar production and other agri-businesses. 25 ﬁrms arecategorized as single factories, the majority of which are also in the ap-
parel and light manufacturing sectors. All of the agri-business EPZs are
stand-alone ﬁrms. Both the average years of stand-alone ﬁrms and in-
dustrial parks is close to 5 years, with standard deviations of 3.5 and
3.4 years, respectively. Attrition is relatively low, with about 5% of the
EPZs having closed during the period considered, but some measure-
ment error is possible due to the difﬁculty in tracking earlier EPZs.
In theory, eligible ﬁrms can locate anywhere in the country. The
regime does not institute a particular area of the territory as being a
free-trade zone, but rather grants the status to the ﬁrm, which needs
to negotiate directly with the municipality (irrespective of locating as
a stand-alone ﬁrm or within an industrial park, a letter of acceptance
from the mayoral ofﬁce of the relevant municipality is a pre-condition,
CZNF 2015). In practice, not all municipalities are prone to receiving
Table 1
Sample description (cross section and panel datasets).
Sample level 1993 1998 2001 2005 2009 Total
Municipalities
with EPZs
80 115 114 126 92 527
1 3 9 16 18 47
Individuals 24,892 23,182 22,298 36,183 29,749 136,304
Individuals (≥15 years) 13,689 13,185 13,306 22,146 20,146 82,472
Households 4412 4125 4075 6779 6375 25,766
Notes: Not all municipalities are observed every year. Municipalities with less than 30
households each year were dropped from the sample. The minimum number of house-
holds per municipality in a given year is 30 and the max excluding Managua is 408
(Managua's max. is 2004).
322 N. Picarelli / Labour Economics 41 (2016) 318–332an exporting zone, and the export-oriented nature of the ﬁrms has
made the western area of the country the natural host.
This dimension underlines the ‘de-facto’ place-based nature of the
EPZ regime in Nicaragua. Place-based policies are deﬁned as policies
that particularly target geographic areas for some form of special treat-
ment including special regulations or tax exemptions (Kline and
Moretti, 2014), in order to create incentives to hire or generate local
economic activity. While in Nicaragua privileges are granted to the
ﬁrm or industrial park, the location decision is subject to the municipal
approval. Once established, EPZs are spatially-ﬁxed, and their propensi-
ty to hire or outsource in the area where they operate implies that the
local economy will be directly impacted through labour, capital, land
and price channels. This is further emphasized in the case of industrial
parks that remain spatially-bound but can increase the number of
ﬁrms located within. In practice, the establishment of EPZs in a given
municipality has the same local effects than a traditional place-based
policy (Wang, 2013, Atkin, 2012). Limitations to factor mobility may
emphasize this dimension. The trade literature has stressed the
importance of analysing the effect of trade policies in local and regional
labourmarkets (Autor et al., 2013, Kovak, 2013, Topalova, 2010), partic-
ularly due to the lack of perfect factormobility across geographical areas
in both developed and developing countries.
For the empirical study, I set a general EPZ dummy variable, EPZmt,
equal to one if an industrial park or stand-alone ﬁrm was authorized
within the municipality, and zero otherwise. I discuss the relevance of
using this level of analysis further in the next section.
3. Data
3.1. Datasets
The data for this analysis were drawn from several sources. First, I
compiled a repeated cross-sectional dataset for the period 1993–2009
based on ﬁve LSMS Household Surveys9 (Encuesta Nacional de Hogares
para la Medición del Nivel de Vida, EMNV) collected by the Nicaraguan
Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Información de Desarrollo,
INIDE), and representative at the national, regional, urban and rural
levels. These contain detailed information on living standards and vari-
ous other households and individual socio-demographic characteristics.
I use this information to construct a panel at the municipal-level and
calculate expenditure deciles at this level of aggregation. These
measures include a correction for the sample bias using sampling
weights. Municipalities with less than 30 households per period were
excluded to reduce measurement error. Overall, the sample comprises
observations for an unbalanced panel of between 82 to 126 municipal-
ities per year— of which 61 are observed for the full period, and 107 are
observed four times (Table 1).10 The data on EPZs was compiled from
various CNZF annual yearbooks, which only contain information on
location and sector of operation of each zone at year end.11 Data on ac-
cessibility measures (road density, ports, airports and railways) was
compiled from reports of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport
(MTI)12 and World Bank logistics' assessments (2004–2011).
3.2. Main deﬁnitions
This analysis follows common practice in referring to themeasure of
living standards as income, which should be interpreted broadly to
encompass all the characteristics associated with geographical location9 The Living StandardsMeasurement Surveyswere developed by theWorld Bank to im-
prove the type and quality of household data collected by statistical ofﬁces in developing
countries. The years of each EMNV are: 1993, 1998, 2001, 2005, and 2009.
10 20municipalities are omitted because of N b 30 rule across the years. As a robustness
check, I run the different speciﬁcations with a balanced panel, omitting observations ob-
served less than 4 times. Conclusions remain unchanged.
11 See Data Appendix II for more details.
12 Ministerio de Transporte e Infraestructura (MTI) Red Vial de Nicaragua.including climate or local public good provision, in order to assume that
individuals with the same level of income at different locations are
equally well-off (Shorrocks and Wan, 2005). Here, following best
practice income is proxied by consumption expenditure (Goldberg
and Pavcnik, 2007). The choice for using consumption expenditure as
a measure of income has been widely discussed in the literature. It is
arguably the most appropriate variable for capturing lifetime wellbeing
(Deaton, 1997) as it better captures intertemporal shifts of resources
and incorporates changes in purchasing power. Expenditure data are
of better quality in LSMS Household Surveys (Deaton, 2005; Banerjee
and Duﬂo, 2007), given that reporting problems are less pronounced
and consumption is less affected by the redesigning of surveys, which
hampers comparability across years. The large period considered in
this analysis, and the existence of a large informal sector (73% of all
jobs in 2010) in Nicaragua also motivate the use of expenditure levels
instead of labour income. Further, wages are under-reported in the
household surveys, particularly in 1993 and 2001 when only between
10 to 20% of working age members report a value. There is no informa-
tion on the location of employment of workers in the household sur-
veys, and I have no access to data on housing prices within
municipalities. These data limitations further justify the use of expendi-
ture per capita as the best approximation of a welfare measure that en-
compasses multiple dimension across time and unit of analysis.
I use constant annual per capita expenditure (in Córdobas of 1999,
C$),13 deﬁned as the household annual net expenditure divided by the
number of persons in the household. All households surveyed and all
of their members are included (though consumption is adjusted de-
pending on members being children or adults). Missing values and
zero incomes have been excluded. Additionally, expenditure has been
adjusted for difference in prices across provinces every year using
local price indices in the households' surveys. Adjusting for spatial
price differences will not alter inequality within regions, and are an im-
portant factor to take into account given the strong correlation of prices
with welfare levels (Shorrocks and Wan, 2005).
As mentioned, to analyse the moments of the expenditure
distribution I follow Milanovic (2005), Milanovic and Ersado (2009)
and partition the real per capita expenditure distribution by deciles at
the municipal level using sampling weights to correct for sample bias.
This method allows me to focus on the pattern of change across all the
deciles shares of thedistribution, and has the advantage of decomposing
the average effect. This method is used for other household characteris-
tics. There are limitations to using this approach for small areas using
household survey data. However, I take several measures to control
for the quality of the values, such as excluding municipalities with too
few observations, and comparing the municipal averages with census
data available for 1993 and 2005. Results approximate well. Tables A.113 I use theManagua CPI from the Central Bank of Nicaragua (CBN) as the overall country
CPI is not available before 2000. The CPI is a Laspeyres-type (1999= 100) index compiled
on the basis of the Household Income and Expenditure Survey of 1998–1999. 15 depart-
mental capitals and two autonomous regions were used to select the products to be in-
cluded in the various baskets and the corresponding weights. These include durables
and non-durables as well as residential rents. A summary methodology is available in
the CBN Boletín Económico, Volume II, Number 2, April - June 2000 (IMF).
Table 2
Summary statistics main outcome variables (1993–2009).
Variable Mean Std. dev N
Average real per capita expenditure, annual 6642.68 7268.44 81,249
Individuals reporting having migrated in the past 5 years 0.15 0.36 82,472
Average real per capita expenditure, annual (municipality) 4824.33 2390.96 527
10th percentile - real per capita expenditure, annual 1976.24 1065.97 527
30th percentile - real per capita expenditure, annual 2890.912 1477.893 527
50th percentile - real per capita expenditure, annual 3890.79 1953.95 527
70th percentile - real per capita expenditure, annual 5289.22 2696.75 527
90th percentile - real per capita expenditure, annual 8792.86 5094.79 527
Share of low-skill (deﬁnition 1) 0.34 0.11 527
Share of high-skill (deﬁnition 1) 0.09 0.09 527
Share of low-skill (deﬁnition 2) 0.37 0.21 527
Share of high-skill (deﬁnition 2) 0.12 0.11 527
EPZ Neighbouring Municipalities (5 to 15 km) 0.05 0.21 527
EPZ Neighbouring Municipalities (15 to 30 km) 0.13 0.34 527
Migrant in the past 5 years (municipality share) 0.10 0.12 527
Notes: The ﬁrst two variables aremeasured at theworking-age individual level. Expendituremeasures are expressed in constant Cordobas of 1999. The share of low and high skill accord-
ing to deﬁnition 1 are determinedwith respect to the skill distribution of the province; deﬁnition 2 is deﬁnedwith respect to years of formal education. See Section 6 for further details. The
share ofmigrants is estimated by individuals reporting havingmigrated to the current municipalities in the previous 5 years. The EPZ neighbouringmunicipalities represents the share of
municipalities at the given km distance to a treated municipality.
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according to treatment and control groups for the beginning and end
of the period studied. These are reassuring in that all deciles display a
similar evolution across the period, with the ratios between treated
and control groups remaining constant in time. As expected individuals
at higher deciles display higher levels of educational achievement,
access to electricity and a smaller proportion is employed in the infor-
mal sector. Generally, the differences within deciles between treatment
and control groups are small. Particularly, household size, average age
and individuals at working age are consistently comparable and evolve
at a similar ratio.
Because of the characteristics discussed in Section 2, it seems logical
to consider municipalities as the unit of analysis. They are the best
approximation of the actual functional area at which ﬁrms and zones
operate, and a fair representation of the local labourmarket. Labourmo-
bility in Nicaragua is limited, not only because of the low-skill level of
the labour force, but because commuting distances are found to be an
important deterrent to participate in the labour market (Jansen et al.,
2007). Excluding Managua, municipalities had a median population ofTable 3
Summary statistics of the EPZ by establishment sequence (1993–2009).
Timing Group 1
[b1999]
Mean SD
A. Granting sequence
Municipalities with newly established EPZs. 4
Total municipalities with EPZs. 4
B. Municipality characteristics
Distance to Managua (km) 56.70 51
Road density (m) 91.30 28
Landlocked (=1) 0.53 0.5
Main trade access (=1 if main port, airport or trade post in municipality) 0.20 0.3
Electricity (% households) 0.99 0.0
Completed primary education 0.27 0.0
Illiterate 0.13 0.0
Economically active population 0.61 0.0
Unemployment 0.07 0.0
Manufacturing (% employed) 0.23 0.0
Agriculture (%employed) 0.08 0.1
Urban 0.90 0.1
Migrants in past ﬁve years 0.10 0.1
Notes:Municipalities are grouped based on the sequence of EPZ establishment. Values are for sam
municipality to the capital city, themeasure excludesManagua; road density corresponds tome
if amunicipality has amajor port, airport or trade post; economically active population correspo
percent employed in different sectors, urban and unemployment levels are census data (1995–
nicipality in the last 5 years.*Never EPZ municipalities vary per year, as per the unbalanced nat20 thousands in 2012. Additionally, they are the ultimate discrete policy
unit for which welfare data is available and they remain the reference
framework for delivering public services and distributing government
funds (Lall and Chakravorty, 2005).
3.3. Descriptive statistics
This section discusses key summary statistics for themain outcomes
and control variables used in the analysis. Table 2 displays period
averages for selected outcomes. They include both municipal-level
variables, and averages for the working age population of the pooled
cross-sectional dataset. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of munic-
ipality characteristics according to treatment status and sequence of EPZ
establishment. Values are period averages. The table examines whether
or not early zones exhibit different characteristics relative to later zones,
and both compared to municipalities never having authorized the es-
tablishment of an exporting zone. For this, I group the municipalities
based on the establishment waves: group 1 [b1999] is composed of
four municipalities that were exposed to EPZs by 1999, it includesGroup 2
[2000–2001]
Group 3
[2002–2005]
Group 4
[2006–2009]
Municipalities
Never EPZ
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
5 7 2
9 16 18 108⁎
.44 43.09 76.25 84.84 48.07 35.88 13.28 142.77 77.85
.51 92.33 24.50 80.68 29.66 225.42 109.39 46.24 40.69
1 0.38 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.36 0.49 0.46 0.50
2 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.41 0.64 0.50 0.31 0.46
1 0.97 0.07 0.94 0.14 0.97 0.03 0.97 0.09
3 0.29 0.03 0.28 0.44 0.29 0.03 0.26 0.06
6 0.18 0.10 0.20 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.31 0.16
5 0.59 0.42 0.58 0.07 0.57 0.05 0.54 0.07
6 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.07
5 0.21 0.08 0.17 0.08 0.17 0.03 0.12 0.08
1 0.16 0.15 0.30 0.30 0.18 0.04 0.55 0.27
1 0.74 0.18 0.57 0.33 0.41 0.30 0.35 0.34
4 0.08 0.97 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.12
ple averages across the period. Distance toManaguameasures the centroids' distance of a
tres of paved roads every 1 sq.km;main trade access is a composite dummy that equal one
nds to individuals betwene 13 and 68 years old as per the deﬁnition of the statistical ofﬁce;
2005).Migrants in the past ﬁve years is the share of individuals that migrated to the mu-
ure of the panel. There are between 64 in 1993 to 108 in 2005.
15 While rank-preservation is in theory a rather constraining assumption, social mobility
in Latin America, and Nicaragua, in particular, is in practise very low. The World Bank
(2013) estimates that since the 1990s more than one in ﬁve individuals remained chron-
ically poor, and approximately the same proportion remained steadily in the middle class
324 N. Picarelli / Labour Economics 41 (2016) 318–332Managua,which is always treated in the sample since theﬁrst industrial
park was opened in 1994; group 2 [2000–2001] is composed of ﬁve
municipalities that granted authorization to new EPZs between 1999
and 2001; group 3 [2002–2005] is composed of seven municipalities
that authorized establishment during this period; and group 4 [2006–
2009] is composed of the ﬁnal waves of municipalities receiving an
exporting zone. Because datawas of poor quality (too few observations)
I had to exclude two municipalities treated in that last wave.
Overall, municipalities receiving EPZs display signiﬁcantly better ac-
cessibilitymeasures (i.e. density of paved roads, access to airports, ports
or trade posts, and proximity to large water bodies), and closer proxim-
ity to the municipality of the capital city. Group 4 is a particular outlier,
probably due to progress in infrastructure across the period. This trend
is to be expected as the choice of location of exporting ﬁrms is unlikely
to be exogenous and should be highly correlated with accessibility and
infrastructure. Similarly, the sectoral compositions also diverge, with
non-treated municipalities showing much higher levels of agricultural
specialization and a predominance of rural areas. Nicaragua remains
overall a rural country, with less than 60% of its population living in
urban areas in 2010 (World Bank). The skill composition displays a
better distribution acrossmunicipalities, differing only in theproportion
of illiterate adultswhich ismuch lower in EPZs areas (20 vs 30%). On the
other hand, all groups show similar levels of access to electricity, unem-
ployment, share ofworking age populations, andmigrants. In this sense,
it would seem as if the geographical distribution of economic activities
across the country is not necessarily correlated with different labour
outcomes. This largely reﬂects the importance of agriculture for the
Nicaraguan economy. Even in 2011, the sector was the main employer
(32% of total employment) and represented 19% of total value added
(above manufacturing).
Fig. A.114 provides a more detailed image of the distribution of the
sector of economic activity across the deciles of per capita expenditure
by years and treatment groups. Both EPZ and no-EPZ municipalities
display similar patterns for services and agriculture, with a higher
concentration at the upper-end and lower-end of the distribution,
respectively. Discrepancies are noticeable however in manufacturing,
construction and transport. EPZ municipalities show a higher concen-
tration in manufacturing at the upper-end of the distribution, despite
a general shift towards the median during the period. The opposite is
visible in the construction sector. Given the size of the change, it could
well reﬂect the modernization of the sector rather than any trade-
related effect.
4. Empirical strategy
The main empirical analysis relies on the difference-in-differences
(DID) framework. For the identiﬁcation strategy, I rely on the variation
provided by the timing of zone creation across the sample of
municipalities.
4.1. Basic speciﬁcations
I deﬁne Eqs. (1) and (2) as the extension of the simple DIDmodel for
multiple periods and groups, in order to estimate the Average Treat-
ment Effect on the Treated (ATT) using both the pooled individual
level dataset andmunicipal averages. As deﬁned in Section 2.2, I denote
EPZ as a dummy variable that switches to one when a municipality m
gets treated in year t. The basic speciﬁcations take the following forms:
Yimt ¼ γ0m þ γ1m:t þ μ t þ δEPZmt þ X0 imtβ þ εimt ð1Þ
Ymt ¼ γm þ μ t þ φEPZmt þ Z0mtθþωimt : ð2Þ14 Figures and Tables A.1–A.13 are contained in online Appendix I.Wherem and t index for municipality (m=1 , ... 126) and year (t=
1993, 1998, 2001, 2005, and 2009) respectively, and i indexes for
working-age individuals. Ymt is the outcome variable of interest in
municipality m at year t; Yimt is the outcome variable of interest for
individual i in municipality m at year t; γm are municipality-level
ﬁxed-effects and μt are time effects. The ﬁxed-effects capture the per-
manent differences in the municipalities' observed and unobserved
characteristics that may inﬂuence the location of EPZs as well as any
time varying shocks. X’ and Z’ are vectors for time-varying individual
and household characteristics. In Eq. (1) they include measures for
household size, age squared, and dummies for gender, economic sector
of employment, migrant status, education level, access to electricity and
urban location. Eq. (2) contains equivalent measures aggregated at the
municipal level (i.e. shares of education levels, households with access
to electricity, urban population and migrants). ωmt (εimt) is the error
term. Following Bertrand et al. (2004) I use robust standard errors clus-
tered at themunicipal level to preventmisleading inference due to seri-
al correlation in the error term across years within a municipality.
Results are robust to the clustering of standard errors at the province
level to account for possible serial correlation at this level of
aggregation.
The parameter of interest are δ and φ which measure the average
effect of the establishment of an EPZ on the outcomes Yimt and Ymt (i.e.
measures of real expenditure per capita). The effect is identiﬁed by
comparingmunicipal outcomes among treated and non-treated groups
before and after EPZ establishment. To control even more richly for
differences across municipalities, I add a municipality-speciﬁc time
trend in the form of interactions between a municipality dummy and
a linear time trend, γ1mt in Eq. (1). This speciﬁcation allows for munici-
palities' unobservable characteristics to follow different trends in time,
which is particularly relevant in the case of a gradual treatment. The
larger dataset allows introducing the trends without compromising
degrees of freedom. I use province-time ﬁxed effects and region-time
ﬁxed effects in alternative speciﬁcation at both individual andmunicipal
level of analysis, to account for sorting across Nicaragua and the concen-
tration of EPZs in the western area of the country.
I measure the effect across the expenditure distribution by
extending the DID method to each quantile (τ) instead of the mean
(Athey and Imbens, 2006). The speciﬁcation takes the following form:
YmtjEPZmt ;ρmt τð Þ ¼ γm τð Þ þ μ t τð Þ þ ψEPZmt τð Þ þW’mt τð Þ αþ ξ τ;ρmtð Þ: ð3Þ
Where notations are the same as previously deﬁned in the simple
DID cases but τ now stands for each decile of the expenditure distribu-
tion estimated at the municipality level. All notations are as speciﬁed
above. I cluster standard errors at both municipal and province levels.
This method referred to as the QDID allows comparing individuals
across both groups and time according to their quantile. Here, the
quantiles are ﬁxed and theDID estimator compares changes in the levels
of expenditure around them, under the identifying assumption that the
growth in expenditure from pre-EPZ to post-EPZ groups at each
particular quantile would have been the same in both treatment and
comparison groups in the absence of treatment. It relies on the assump-
tions of rank-preservation15 and homogeneity of treatment effect across
individuals (Athey and Imbens, 2006).in the subcontinent, with Nicaragua being the second-worse country in the region in
terms of theproportion of individuals not displaying any type of upwardmobility between
1998 and 2005 (80%). Intergenerational mobility shows similar patterns.
16 Because of the small sample size, I use different values of k from 3 to 5. I note that the
k-nearest neighbouring matching with replacement is likely to use some control munici-
palities multiple times in different periods.
Table 4
Balance of covariates for the pre-treatment period, by sequence of establishment — preferred control group (road network).
Sequence of establishment Group 1
[b1999]
RN
Control
t-test Group 2
[20,002,001]
RN
Control
t-test Group 3
[20,022,005]
RN
Control
t-test Group 4
[20,062,009]
RN
Control
t-test
A. Municipality characteristics
Distance to Managua (km) 72.54 101.72 −1.70* 42.43 107.11 −3.9*** 90.96 103.60 −1.00 35.65 107.92 −4 56***
Road density (m) 84.67 71.67 0.47 92.00 71.88 1.26 78.42 72.28 0.51 225.42 156.85 3.01***
Landlocked (=1) 0.67 0.71 −0.18 0.40 0.74 −2.38** 0.57 0.74 −1.50 0.36 0.76 −2.98**
Main trade access
(=1 if main port, airport or
trade post in municipality)
0.27 0.43 −1.49 0.20 0.43 −1.48 0.42 0.42 −0.01 0.63 0.42 1.43
Electricity (% households) 0.99 0.82 0.99 0.94 0.86 1.00 0.93 0.88 0.97 0.89 1.33
Completed primary education 0.27 0.29 −0.29 0.29 0.30 −0.03 0.27 0.27 −0.01 0.29 0.27 0.97
Illiterate 0.22 0.35 0.22 0.24 0.32 −1.42 0.24 0.31 −1.73* 0.21 0.29 −1.56
Economically active population 0.54 0.51 0.97 0.56 0.53 1.62 0.55 0.54 1.03 0.55 0.54 0.43
Unemployment 0.03 0.02 0.9 0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.04 0.04 1.0 0.12 0.03 1.20
Manufacturing (% employed) 0.18 0.13 1.10 0.16 0.1. 1.17 0.16 0.13 LI 0.17 0.13 1.64
Agriculture (%employed) 0.08 0.47 −2.29** 0.16 0.50 −3.62*** 0.30 0.5 −2.16** 0.20 0.48 −2.11**
Urban 0.90 0.38 2.39** 0.78 0.38 3.42*** 0.56 0.39 1.98** 0.35 0.40 −0.47
Migrants in past ﬁve years 0.01 0.02 −0.36 0.01 0.02 −1.05 0.07 0.07 −0.07 0.08 0.10 −0.47
B. Pre-trend, selected outcomes
Average real per capita expenditure,
annual
0.99 0.59 0.83 0.27 0.46 −0.42 0.48 0.61 −0.56 0.23 0.47 −0.99
10th p- real per capita expenditure,
annual.
1.10 0.70 0.73 0.53 0.53 0.00 0.71 0.71 0.03 0.29 0.60 −1.13
50th p- real per capita expenditure,
annual
1.13 0.67 0.78 0.32 0.61 −0.51 0.60 0.69 −0.32 0.25 0.53 −1.00
90th p- real per capita expenditure,
annual
0.83 0.63 0.31 0.48 0.54 −0.10 0.57 0.64 −0.27 0.23 0.47 −0.83
Share of high-skill over low-skill (1) 4.30 4.02 0.07 2.28 4.21 −1.02 8.80 3.49 2.48** 2.46 2.61 −0.09
Share of high-skill over low-skill (2) −0.71 −0.50 −0.26 −0.69 −0.48 −0.54 −0.56 −0.47 −0.21 −0.26 −0.09 −0.35
N= 4 101 5 91 7 90 2 93
Notes: Municipalities are grouped based on the sequence of EPZ establishment. Values are for simple averages for the pre-treatment period. Deﬁnitions are as in Table 3. Formunicipalities
treated before 2000, thehistorical trends denote the average growth rate of the outcomesbefore 2001. Iwould otherwise havenopre-treatment trends for this group. A similar approach is
done for the rest of the groups, but strictly considering only the pre-treatment period. The control group is deﬁned with respect to the density of paved road.
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Given the setting here, there are three main threats to identiﬁcation
to address. As most spatially-bound policies these concern the reverse
causality and omitted variable bias related to the non-random choice
of EPZs location across time and space (i.e. sorting), and the limitations
related to the fact that the experimented created here may not coincide
with the administrative boundaries used (i.e. ﬁrm spillovers – creation
and diversion –, and mobility of individuals). I will empirically evaluate
the last two issues in Sections 5.4 and 6.1.
I address the issue of the endogenous location of EPZs areas in sever-
al ways. Regarding unobservable factors I allow for municipality and
year ﬁxed-effects. These allowme to sweep out time-invariant features
of themunicipality as well as time-speciﬁc dynamics. Additionally, I use
province-time dummies and region-time dummies that control for
omitted variables that change over time within these levels of aggrega-
tion. Some speciﬁcations also include municipality-level time trends to
control for any omitted variable that varies over timewithinmunicipal-
ities in an approximately linear fashion.
I further reﬁne the identiﬁcation strategywith the construction of al-
ternative control groups based on relevant observable municipal char-
acteristics. One important challenge in the evaluation of spatially-
bound policies is the selection of appropriate counterfactuals. The
ideal control municipalities here are areas economically similar to EPZ
municipalities but lacking zones and ﬁrms' establishment. There are
many reasons why using all never treated municipalities would yield
bias estimates (i.e. different sectoral skill and age compositions for in-
stance). An ideal approach would rely on areas that were targeted at
some point in time but where a zone ﬁnally was not created, using the
eligibility criteria to ensure similarity (Greenstone et al., 2010). An alter-
native, would be to use the temporal difference between treatedmunic-
ipalities to compare them against each other (Busso et al., 2013; Wang,
2013). I do not have information on eligible municipalities thateventually did not receive an exporting zone. Further, because of the se-
quence and relatively small number of treated areas in earlier phases I
cannot use the temporal sequence to compare municipalities against
each other. Instead, I use municipalities' observable characteristics to
deﬁne alternative control municipalities. While limitations to this ap-
proach remain, tests for the balance of covariates and pre-treatment
outcome trends give me conﬁdence on their validity.
The export-oriented nature of EPZs and its human capital needs
imply that both accessibility conditions (i.e. ports, airports and roads),
basic infrastructure and the educational attainments are likely to play
an important role in the choice of location of the industrial parks and
ﬁrms. The ﬁrst approach is thus to match municipalities based on
these and related observable elements, using propensity scorematching
to complement the DID strategy (Abadie, 2005; Imbens and
Wooldridge, 2009). This approach is widely used in the literature, and
has generally been shown to produce sensible counterfactual groups.
For this, I estimate the propensity score (logit) for a municipality to
receive EPZs based on a series of pre-treatment variables for each of
the treatment sequences using a k-nearest neighbour approach,16 and
use only matched municipalities as the comparison group. As shown
in Tables A.3 andA.4 there is a large overlap in p-scores between treated
andmatched municipalities, particularly for groups one and four. T-test
and pseudo-R2 are both fairly low after matching which suggests that
potentially important selection criteria become not signiﬁcant after
matching.
The second approach is to deﬁne the control municipalities based on
the quality of their road infrastructure and distance to the capital city
(Managua). Given the limited development of Nicaraguan ports, air-
ports and railways, road networks remain the main mode of transport
Fig. 2. Parallel trends— selected outcome variables, preferred control group.Notes: Figures depict parallel trends of levels of real expenditure per capita according to treatment and control
groups. Main control municipalities are selected according to the density of the road network. On the left side, the treated include only those treated in 2001, and on the right side the
treated are only those treated in 2005. Values are in thousands of constant Cordobas (C$1999).
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327N. Picarelli / Labour Economics 41 (2016) 318–332for most domestic movements and a large share of imports and exports
(World Bank, 2011). Good roads are not only likely to be one key
determinant for EPZs location choices, but they may also be correlated
with higher levels of regional development. I use the metres of paved
roads every 1 km2 to account for road quality, and set the threshold at
the minimum in treated municipalities (40 m). At the same time, dis-
tance to the capital city is also likely to be a key factor in EPZ location,
as ﬁrms are drawn towards it to beneﬁt from agglomeration economies
and higher levels of human capital. I set the threshold to the maximum
distance for an EPZ municipality (b170 km).17 Despite the fact this
counterfactual is constructed in a more arbitrary way, it imposes less
restrictions in terms of observables characteristics. Table 4 shows that
there is signiﬁcant overlap between this control group (group 2) and
the treatment areas. While the propensity-score matched municipali-
ties aremore balanced in relation to theurban–rural dimension, the sec-
ond group seems slightly closer in terms of educational attainment. In
any case, with both cases, controlling for speciﬁc covariates will wipe-
out any remaining difference between the two groups.
I choose group 2 as the preferred counterfactual as it imposes less
restrictions in terms of sample size, makes fewer assumptions on the
municipal characteristics linked to the programme, and parallel trends
in levels of pre-treatment outcomes are more consistent (Figs. 2 and
A.2). I formally test the assumption of parallel trends for the main
speciﬁcation by including pre-treatment trends; these results are sup-
portive of the identiﬁcation strategy (Table A.6).18 The common trend
assumption that the two groups' measured outcomes would have
followed the same trends over time in the absence of policy, is essential
to support the DID framework. Ultimately, I compare results with both
methods and conclusions are unchanged (results with the matched
municipalities are on Appendix I).5. Basic results
5.1. Average treatment effect of EPZ establishment
Table 5 presents the results of the basic DID speciﬁcations (Eqs. (1) &
(2)) using both the working-age population dataset and themunicipal-
level outcomes. The different columns explore the sensitivity of the
results to different area ﬁxed-effects and time trends. Overall, I ﬁnd
that the establishment of EPZs increases the average level of real per
capita expenditure in the treated municipalities, with point estimates
ranging between C$800–460 depending on speciﬁcations. The size is
nontrivial but relatively small if we consider the large time span of the
analysis. It amounts to about 10 to 12% of the average levels across the
period. It is reassuring to see that the magnitude of the effect and its
statistical signiﬁcance remain stable across the speciﬁcations, particu-
larly with the addition of municipality-time trends. Further, results are
consistent irrespective of the sample used, though they lose precision
with the panel dataset as observations are reduced. Using the alterna-
tive control group based on propensity-score matching does not alter
the results (Table A.5).17 Earlier versions of this paper also included a control group that excluded the two au-
tonomous regions of theAtlantic coast (RAAN andRAAS). These correspond to the poorest
areas of the country and also have very particular ethnic and economic characteristic. The
inclusion of province-ﬁxed effects and region-time ﬁxed-effects addresses this issue in a
parametrical way.
18 I run a formal test of parallel trends in the main speciﬁcations of Eqs. (1) and (2) by
including pre-treatment trends in the fashion of Greenstone et al. (2010). For this, I aug-
ment Eqs. (1) and (2)with amunicipality-speciﬁc trendvariable deﬁned as the interaction
between municipality speciﬁc linear-time trends and the treatment dummy variable EPZ
as previously deﬁned.Overall, coefﬁcients on pre-treatment trends are not statistically sig-
niﬁcant supporting the conclusions of the effect not being the result of different pre-
existent trends between treated and control municipalities (see Table A.6 in Appendix I).5.2. Deciles of the expenditure distribution
Table 6 presents the results of DID estimates across moments of the
real per capita expenditure distribution of treated municipalities
(Eq. (3)). In interpreting these results, it should be kept in mind that I
estimate treatment effect on each decile of the expenditure distribution
of treated municipalities strictly with respect to its respective decile in
the control group. As noted, this implies the assumption of rank-
invariance. While this is a strong assumption, social mobility in Latin
America and particularly in Nicaragua has been very low since the
early 1990s.19 Caution is still warrantedwhen interpreting these results,
and I refrain from making any reference with respect to within-area
inequality dynamics.
The most salient feature in Table 6 is the containment of the
treatment effect at the top-end of the distribution (80th and 90th
percentiles), with point estimates signiﬁcant at 10% levels. The size of
is much larger in this case, ranging at about 20 to 25% of the average
levels of per capita expenditure of the top deciles for the period,
suggesting that on average, the establishment of exporting zones proﬁts
the top deciles of the distribution in host municipalities the most. Point
estimates are consistent to the inclusion of different time-area ﬁxed-
effects, as well as to the clustering of standard errors at the province
level and against the alternative control group (Table A.7). The
coefﬁcient at the 10th percentile are also positive and signiﬁcant (at
10% level) in one of the speciﬁcations. The size is smaller, on average
EPZs increase the expenditure levels of the bottom decile by 10% across
the period.
The fact that such a strong concentration is visiblewhendecomposing
the average treatment effect across the expenditure distribution, pro-
vides support for two alternative but complementary theoretical intui-
tions. The ﬁrst one, relates to the various models of urban economics
that integrate land prices' responses and labourmobility dynamics for es-
timating welfare at the local level. Kline and Moretti (2014) show that
mobility responses may lead the local cost of living to change, which in
turn can lead landlords or high-skill incomers, to capture the beneﬁts
associated with the ﬁrm's arrival. Evidence of this on US empowerment
zones is found by Reynolds and Rohlin (2015). The second relates to
international trade models that put emphasis on the existence of a
high-skill premium in the exporting sector stemming either fromproduc-
tivity gains or higher skill intensity (see Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007 for
review). Topalova (2010) emphasizes how these dynamics are likely to
be larger in the case of rigid labour markets. Although information on
the skill composition ofworkerswithin EPZs is not available,manufactur-
ing ﬁrms in Nicaragua do exhibit higher high-to-low skill ratios, with on
average only 34% of the workforce in the ﬁrms classiﬁed as unskilled
(Nicaragua Enterprise Survey, World Bank 2010). The positive coefﬁcient
of the ﬁrst decile may also offer some support for polarization theories
(Autor andDorn, 2013), according towhich new technologies and the re-
lated inﬂows in skilled labour in local labour markets may have
reallocated low-skill labour into lower-earnings services occupations.
There is no solid evidence of polarization in developing countries yet,
but it is plausible to imagine the changes happening between the formal
and informal sectors, particularly in more urbanized areas in countries
with small middle-classes.
The conclusions of the basic speciﬁcations are somewhat counter-
intuitive with the mediatized image of the zones as prime generators
of employment for the unskilled labour force. Data limitations prevent
me from completely disentangling the mechanisms through which
ﬁrms operate, however I address possible channels next by looking at
the effect across the skill distribution and the effect of EPZ formation
on labour mobility.19 The fact that individual characteristics across each decile remain relatively constant in
both groups and with similar relative sizes, support the use of this assumption. See foot-
note 18.
Table 6
DID estimates of the effect of EPZs across the expenditure distribution in treated
municipalities.
Real expenditure per capita (1) (2)
10th percentile 218.3 232.6⁎
(145.1) (138.0)
20th percentile 143.8 149.8
(175.7) (169.9)
30th percentile 169.2 173.1
(219.7) (211.4)
40th percentile 213.8 209.5
(228.2) (218.5)
50th percentile 258.4 245.2
(264.8) (251.5)
60th percentile 271.3 250.9
(317.7) (302.5)
70th percentile 463.2 414.9
(359.9) (345.4)
80th percentile 844.0⁎ 785.6
(506.5) (475.0)
90th percentile 2138⁎ 2061⁎
(1,223) (1,109)
Year FE ✓ ✓
Municipality FE ✓ ✓
Province-year dummies ✓
Region-year dummies ✓
Covariates ✓ ✓
Observations 375 375
Municipalities 106 106
Notes: Dependent variables are deciles of real expenditure distribution. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality. Covariates include illiteracy rate, the
share of population with primary and tertiary education, the share of urban population,
migrants and share of households with access to electricity at municipal-level. Results
are estimated against the preferred control group using the road network buffer.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
Table 5
DID estimates of the effect of EPZs on average real expenditure per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EPZ 800.5⁎⁎ 639.6⁎⁎ 525.8⁎⁎ 477.4⁎⁎ 457.9⁎⁎
(353.6) (317.8) (214.1) (203.9) (207.4)
Observations 52,997 52,997 375 375 375
R-sq. 0.341 0.339 0.722 0.818 0.914
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Municipality FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Municipality-year trend ✓ ✓
Province-year dummies ✓ ✓
Region-year dummies ✓
Covariates ✓ ✓ ✓
Municipalities 106 106 106 106 106
Notes: Dependent variable is levels of real expenditure per capita. Robust standard errors
in parentheses, clustered at municipality. Covariates in column 2 include dummies for
time-varying individual and household characteristics: educational level, age square,
gender, urban, sector of work, household size and having migrated within the past ﬁve
years. Individual observations are only for working age individuals. Covariates in column
4–5 include illiteracy rate, the share of population with primary and tertiary education,
the share of urban population, migrants and share of households with access to electricity
at municipal-level. Results are estimated against the preferred control group using the
road network buffer.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
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Before introducing any additional extensions, I explore the time
dynamics of the establishment of exporting zones. Considering the
relatively long period covered, it is important to address the question
of how the programme impacts expenditure levels across time. The
literature has emphasized that the impact of EPZs may take time to
materialize. In some cases it has also been found to diminish with the
years, as low labour costs vanish.
To explore the time pattern, I compute a modiﬁed version of Eq. (3)
adding a set of dummy variables for leads and lags of the year of EPZs
authorization (Autor, 2003). Speciﬁcally, I add indicator variables for
11, 8 and 3 years before and after EPZ establishment.20 The dummies
are equal to one in only one year each per treated municipality. The
treatment dummy EPZmt equals one only on the ﬁrst year of EPZ estab-
lishment, or year zero. To help visualize the results Fig. 3 displays point
estimates at different moments of the distribution with the 95% conﬁ-
dence intervals; estimates are reported in Table 7.
The positive sign and relatively large size of most of the coefﬁcient
seem to indicate a consistent incremental effect on the level of real
expenditure per capita at all percentiles of the distribution with the
more years of EPZ operation. Only the 90th percentile is statistically
signiﬁcant for year zero. The larger effect still occurs at the very upper-
tail of the distribution, notably at the 90th percentilewith statistically sig-
niﬁcant point estimates at 5 and 1% levels that imply a growing absolute
effect of about 10 to 20% per period. However, the time decomposition in-
dicates statistically signiﬁcant effects at all deciles above the 30th after
8 years of EPZ operation, sustained only for the median deciles after
that period. Different explanations are conceivable here. Classic trickle
down mechanisms might be taking place, resulting from both medium-
term consumption and production dynamics after the expansion of the
zones, or the increases in productivity over the years. Negative values be-
fore treatment are too imprecise to make any conclusion,21 but they are
supportive of the effect resulting from the arrival of new exporting ﬁrms.
Findings of this section shed light on themore complex dynamics of
the EPZ policy. They highlight the predominance of the effect at the20 Leads and lags of 4 and 8 years also include municipalities with 3 and 7 years, respec-
tively, in order to avoid noise from a dummieswith fewmunicipalities. Each lead contains
4 to 16 treated municipalities.
21 Theparticular negative shock at−8 years coincideswith thepost-hurricaneMitch pe-
riod hitting Nicaragua.upper-tail of the distribution. At the same time, they are also suggestive
of a diffusion of the treatment effect at the middle of the distribution
and 10th percentile, after 8 and 11 years of zone establishment.
5.4. Skill distribution
I next use the distribution of per capita years of education to verify
the predictions of the conceptual channels (i.e. a skill premium related
to the establishment of EPZ). Ideally, I would want to break down the
skill distribution by industry and test the effect of EPZ establishment
across the full interactions of skill and industries (Atkin, 2012). Howev-
er, data limitations regarding industrial afﬁliations and labour earnings
prevent me from disentangling the effect further.
Given the large proportion of unskilled individuals, testing for the
effect of EPZ relative to skill-levels is not straightforward. 30% of the
working age sample reports zero years of formal education across the
period and only 5.4 reports having completed education at the tertiary
level. For this reason, I use relative education levels. First, I calculate
the distribution of education (years of completed education22) amongst
all working age individuals by year and provinces.23 Following Atkin
(2012) I then generate a three level skill-speciﬁc measure. I code as
low-skill, individuals below and at the 40th percentile of the schooling
distribution, as mid-skill, individuals above the 40th and up until the
70th percentile, and as high-skill individuals with years of schooling
above the 70th percentile.24 With these measures in hand, I rerun
speciﬁcations for Eq. (1), but augment the regression with 3 distinct22 Years of schooling or completed formal education span from 0 to 20 in the sample.
23 I use working-age individuals given that using the sample of employed instead does
not allow me to generate a full distribution. Similarly, using municipalities provide an in-
complete picture.
24 The distribution by skill levels is skewed towards the lower tail in both treated and
non-treated municipalities, but the proportion of low-skill is much higher in non-
treated municipalities. This is largely due to the period 1993–1998 (Fig. A.3).
Fig. 3. Events study— selected outcome variables. Notes: The horizontal axis measures the number of years since the EPZ programme took place. The vertical line represents thousands of
Cordobas. The plots connect by the solid line indicate the effect on the levels of real per capita expenditure compared to the period immediately before, the dotted lines are the 95% CI
where the standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. See Table 7 for point estimates.
329N. Picarelli / Labour Economics 41 (2016) 318–332dummies created from the interaction of the treatment variable and the
binary variables for each skill level (low, mid and high).25
Table 8 shows the results of this regression for the average level of
real per capita expenditures for the working-age individuals. Results
are robust to the inclusion of province-ﬁxed effects and the clustering
of standard-errors at the province level. The ordering and signs of the
coefﬁcients are largely as expected due to ﬁndings in Section 5.2. The
highly signiﬁcant and positive effect contained at the high-skill level
supports the view that the gains from EPZ establishment are larger for
the upper-deciles of the distribution. It is hard to be conclusive on
what is driving the high-skill individuals to beneﬁt the most from EPZ
formation without decomposing by industry. These ﬁndings seem
supportive of the channels previously mentioned in Section 5.2. I ﬁnd
similar results using an alternative measure for skill-levels based on
the actual level of education achievement26 (column 2). Low-skill indi-
viduals also register signiﬁcant positive point estimates here, which is
consistent with the heterogeneous time dynamics and the bottom dec-
ile being signiﬁcant in some speciﬁcations.25 Mid-skill is the omitted variable.
26 Here low-skill corresponds toworking age individuals reporting no years of formal ed-
ucation, mid-skill stands for those having completed primary school, and high-skill in-
cludes those having completed secondary education and/or university. I include
secondary education as a high-skill given that only 5% of the entire sample has tertiary
formation.5.5. Relocation of workers
An important concern that remains relates to possible bias from in-
ternal mobility across areas during the period studied. Does low and
high-skill labour relocate across space in response to the labour supply
shock? The most important threat to validity in the place-based policy
literature relates to compositional changes in the distribution of
workers within units of analysis. This threat is greater during large
time periods, like the one here.
There are two dimensions to consider in this case. The ﬁrst is
possible internal migration across municipalities. This would impose
an upward or downward bias on my results, depending on which type
of migrants arrives or leaves treated areas. This dimension is closely re-
lated to the skill composition of themigrants, as it could be foreseen that
the higher skill may be drawn towards EPZ's employment, and on the
contrary the lower-skill may be pushed to rural areas. Additionally,
large exogenous inﬂows of migrants may alter both income levels and
ﬁrms location decisions related to the impact of the ﬂows on local
wages. During the entire period considered, 10.7% of the sample reports
having moved from another municipality in the past ﬁve years.27 The
ﬂow however seems to have been under-reported in 1998 and 2009,
both years displaying extremely low percentages (2–5%). Excluding27 As deﬁned in the Household Surveys. This is the onlymeasure consistent for the 5 dif-
ferent surveys.
Table 7
The heterogeneous time dynamics of EPZ establishment.
10th
percentile
20th
percentile
30th
percentile
40th
percentile
50th
percentile
60th
percentile
70th
percentile
80th
percentile
90th
percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EPZ establishment, t− 11 −134.9 −85.65 −109.9 118.3 228.4 536.8 190.9 310.1 −99.58
(122.3) (216.1) (260.9) (249.7) (289.2) (487.8) (551.6) (491.2) (1475)
EPZ establishment, t− 8 −298.3⁎⁎ −244.8 −171.0 −193.6 −184.0 −221.0 −594.3⁎ −663.6 −1889⁎
(127.1) (174.7) (170.4) (201.1) (211.4) (253.4) (341.9) (448.8) (1034)
EPZ establishment, t− 4 −10.84 140.8 337.8 266.8 105.9 180.5 −40.45 34.72 −559.7
(215.9) (230.5) (310.7) (321.5) (313.5) (396.0) (440.5) (510.6) (871.0)
EPZ establishment, t0 −16.95 −20.45 172.4 231.8 163.3 287.7 391.4 537.1 1025
(175.1) (189.8) (177.5) (216.2) (239.5) (272.0) (511.7) (548.0) (1316)
EPZ establishment, t + 4 124.9 271.6 336.3 363.5 390.7 296.7 238.6 722.2 1032⁎
(240.7) (243.6) (301.5) (277.7) (273.6) (316.7) (417.3) (545.9) (528.3)
EPZ establishment, t + 8 66.13 399.8 462.4⁎ 651.6⁎⁎⁎ 1029⁎⁎⁎ 1163⁎⁎⁎ 1149⁎⁎ 1942⁎⁎ 2591⁎⁎
(180.1) (284.4) (259.0) (217.8) (383.6) (436.2) (464.6) (845.2) (1052)
EPZ establishment, t + 11 589.1⁎⁎ 492.9 782.7 858.8 1148⁎⁎⁎ 895.0⁎ 1022 962.8 3237⁎⁎⁎
(258.7) (344.7) (523.6) (532.5) (433.8) (478.1) (680.5) (634.0) (1140)
Observations 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375
R-sq. 0.709 0.748 0.752 0.774 0.785 0.778 0.702 0.728 0.630
Municipalities 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106
Notes: Dependent variables are deciles of the real per capita expenditure distribution. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality. All regressions include year and
municipality ﬁxed-effects and province-year dummies. Covariates include illiteracy rate, the share of population with primary and tertiary education, and the share of urban population,
migrants and households with access to electricity at municipal-level. All leads are equal to one in only one year each per adopting state. EPZ dummy (t0) equals one only for year of es-
tablishment. EPZ t +/− 4 includes t +/− 3, and EPZ t +/− 8 includes t +/− 7, to have balanced dummies. Results are estimated against the preferred control group using the road net-
work buffer.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
Table 9
The effect of EPZ formation on skill composition.
330 N. Picarelli / Labour Economics 41 (2016) 318–332these, more than seven percent of working age population is deﬁned as
an internal migrant (7.6 and 7.7 in treated and control municipalities,
respectively). There is limited information regarding origin and destina-
tion of the ﬂows, with data available only for 1998. For that year, 7.8% of
the migrants moved to a municipality hosting an EPZ, with most ﬂows
taking place among non-treated areas.
To address this issue, I start by estimating the likelihood ofmigrating
for the working age population following the establishment of a zone in
a given area, using both OLS and logit estimators. Results are reported in
Table A.10. I ﬁnd no evidence of a statistically signiﬁcant impact.
Additionally, point estimates are always very small, permitting to
discardmajor bias from large displacement following the establishment
of a zone in a given area. The absence of perfect factor mobility is not
surprising. The World Bank (2009, 2012) estimates that during the
2000s, only 10% of the improvements in living standards were relatedTable 8
The effect of EPZs by skill-level.
Skill-distribution Education-level
(1) (2)
EPZ 486.1 204.0
(466.7) (485.1)
Low-Skill ∗ EPZ 29.98 209.1⁎⁎
(134.4) (70.18)
High-Skill ∗ EPZ 1810⁎⁎⁎ 2018⁎⁎⁎
(189.4) (115.6)
Observations 52,997 52,997
R-sq. 0.338 0.346
Municipalities 106 106
Notes: Dependent variables are levels of real expenditure per capita. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality. All regressions include time and
municipality ﬁxed effects, municipality-time trends and province-time dummies.
Covariates include education level, illiteracy rate, as well as the share of urban population,
migrants andhouseholdswith access to electricity atmunicipal-level. Column 1 shows the
results using the years of education to deﬁne the skill distribution. Column uses the second
deﬁnition using the levels of formal education. Results are estimated against the preferred
control group using the road network buffer.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.to population shifts (from rural to urban), and ﬁnd little evidence of
changes in the structural distribution of employment in the last decade,
with a continued dominance of the agricultural sector. As a second test, I
estimate the effect of EPZ formation on changing the skill composition
of the residing population. This may capture ﬁner dynamics due to
migration patterns that are not visible using the overall migrants'
measure. Results in Table 9 are in line with theoretical intuitions. Al-
though the sign of the coefﬁcients on the share of high skill changes
with respect to the deﬁnition, this is due to the larger weight given to
the medium-skill (primary school) using the second deﬁnition. I focus
on the ﬁrst deﬁnition. Here point estimates on the high-skill are large
and positive though not statistically signiﬁcant. Conversely, thereDeﬁnitions
Skill deﬁnition 1 Skill deﬁnition 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of high skill 0.253 0.134 −0.205 −0.242
(0.176) (0.150) (0.228) (0.221)
Share of low skill −0.01 0.000 −0.018 −0.007
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.0112)
Share of high to low skill 0.0369* 0.0251 0.005 0.002
(0.022) (0.021) (0.016) (0.011)
Observations 375 375 375 375
R-sq. 0.753 0.865 0.845 0.833
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Municipality FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Municipality-year trend ✓ ✓
Province-year dummies ✓ ✓
Covariates ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Cluster Municipalities 106 106 106 106
Notes: Dependent variables are the share of high and low skill working age populations
and the proportion of high to low skill populations at themunicipal level. Robust standard
errors clustered atmunicipality are in parentheses. Columns 1–2 deﬁne skills according to
the distribution of years of education, while columns 3–4, and deﬁne skills according to
the level of formal education achieved. Deﬁnition are in Section 5.4. Covariates are as in
Table 6. Results are estimated against the preferred control group using the road network
buffer.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎p b 0.1.
Table 10
The effect of EPZ establishment & spillover dynamics.
10th
percentile
20th
percentile
30th
percentile
40th
percentile
50th
percentile
60th
percentile
70th
percentile
80th
percentile
90th
percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EPZ 232.8⁎ 121.0 127.4 227.2 271.3 307.3 532.2 942.5⁎ 2123⁎
(134.6) (173.9) (214.3) (231.7) (268.2) (319.9) (376.5) (491.4) (1142)
Neighbouring municipalities1 −147.1 −401.4 −362.3 109.8 12.05 74.33 454.2 699.8 −238.4
(5 to 15 km) (327.0) (306.1) (381.1) (389.3) (343.1) (322.7) (421.0) (538.6) (493.9)
Neighbouring municipalities2 −139.6 −237.4 −357.6⁎ −257.7 −239.9 −142.6 −170.1 −104.1 −435.0
(15 to 35 km) (127.5) (159.3) (184.7) (176.0) (222.3) (248.9) (300.7) (415.8) (568.3)
Observations 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375
R-sq. 0.687 0.735 0.739 0.756 0.759 0.753 0.691 0.699 0.687
Number of Muni. 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106
Notes: Dependent variables are deciles of the real per capita expenditure distribution. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality. All regressions include year and
municipality ﬁxed-effects and province-year dummies. Covariates include illiteracy rate, the share of population with primary and tertiary education, the share of urban population, mi-
grants and the share of households with access to electricity at municipal-level. The variables Neighbour Municipalities are dummy variables that equal one if a municipality's centroid is
situated at 5 to 15 km, and 15 km to 35 km distance from a treated municipality, and zero otherwise. I use the centroid's distance to avoid noise from larger municipalities. Results are
estimated against the preferred control group using the road network buffer.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
331N. Picarelli / Labour Economics 41 (2016) 318–332seems to be negative to zero effects on the low skill. Overall, the share of
the high-to-low skill does seem to be impacted, increasing by 3% across
the period. Though not robust across speciﬁcations, results are signiﬁ-
cant at 10% level. These changes are in line with the theoretical mecha-
nisms put forward. The small size of the impact means the increase in
the proportion of higher-skill workers in treated municipalities follow-
ing the establishment of an EPZ is unlikely to be driving the average pos-
itive effects of the baseline results.
The second dimension to address concerns the general out-
migration phenomenon of the poor in Nicaragua. Similar to internal
migration, large out-migration ﬂows would also alter the composition
of the labour force. It is estimated that near half a million of
Nicaraguanmigrated to neighbouring Costa Rica since 1994. To address
this issue, I run the previous equations holding constant population
weights of 1993 (using census data and initial sampling weights).
Results remainunchangeddiscarding any strong compositional changes
from out-migration (Table A.11).6. Extensions & robustness checks
The ﬁnal empirical section contains some alternative speciﬁcations
that examine the robustness of the previous conclusions.28 Related to the low-skill level of the labour force, the cost of transport with respect to
minimum living standards and frequent transportation strikes, commuting distances are
found to be an important deterrent for participating in the labour market (Jansen et al.,
2007).
29 The measure is of course imperfect. While using the centroid's distance offers the ad-
vantage of reducing the noise from larger municipalities where a large proportion would
not be in contact with treated areas, it might also exclude some bordering zones. Smaller
units of analysis and household's geo-referenceswould be needed for amore precisemea-
sure. For simplicity, I refer to the measure as the direct distance between municipalities,
but it always registers the distance between the centroids of two municipalities.6.1. Spillover dynamics & commuting
This section addresses the concerns related to possible interactions
taking place between an EPZ municipality and its neighbours. If these
exist, not taking them into considerationwould lead to a bias estimation
of the EPZ effects.
I deﬁne spillovers as any form of business diversion or creation that
could take place because of agglomeration forces between treated and
control municipalities adjacent to each other. Backward linkages
between EPZs and local producers are probably the main mechanism
through which spillovers can be expected to happen. These could lead
to neighbouring areas being indirectly ‘treated’ or on the contrary, to
the relocation of economic activity closer to EPZs, in detriment of
control municipalities. Additionally, I consider commuting behaviour
as a form of spillover. Individuals working in a treated municipality
but residing in a neighbouring area are likely to generate similar types
of possible externalities. Both mechanisms are hard to measure.
Information on commuting is only available for 2001, when it
represented 3.56% of the total sample (5.05 and 3.02% in treated andcontrol municipalities, respectively). This is consistent with some
studies ﬁnding limited labour mobility in Nicaragua.28
In order to formally test for the possibility of these two dynamics, I
measure treatment effect across the real expenditure distribution of
municipalities adjacent to a treated municipality. For this, I compute a
modiﬁed version of Eq. (3) adding a set of dummy variables that switch
to one for municipalities neighbouring a treated area. Because of the
particular small size of Nicaraguan municipalities in the west part of
the country, considering the shared border as criteria for proximity
would imply denoting the vast majority of control municipalities in
the region as neighbours. Instead, I use the municipality's distance
from its centroid to the centroid of the nearest treated one using two
levels of distance, one set at between 5 to 15 km and the other at 15
to 35 km.29 This differentiation allows accounting for both dimensions,
commuting with the closer group, and more formal spillover effects
with the one further away.
Table 10 provides the DID estimates augmented with the neighbour
dummies on the deciles of the real per capita expenditure distribution. It
is encouraging to ﬁnd a close similarity in the size, sign and statistical
signiﬁcance of the EPZ coefﬁcients to the ones in previous estimations.
Point estimates on neighbouring areas seem to indicate low (negative)
to no spillover effect from EPZ location. Only one coefﬁcient shows
statistical signiﬁcance but the size is not higher than 2%. Despite the
sign being consistently negative for the larger ring, bias from this
phenomena can be expect to be very small, validating the previous
estimates.
6.2. Balanced panel & weight of capital city
Given that the identiﬁcation strategy relies on the timing and cross-
section variation of EPZ establishment across municipalities, this ﬁnal
empirical section addresses the possibility that the results are driven
by the inclusion of particular outliers. First, I limit the sample to
municipalities observed for at least 4 of the 5 periods considered.
332 N. Picarelli / Labour Economics 41 (2016) 318–332Second, I exclude the capital city (and municipality) of Managua from
my sample to verify that this larger agglomeration is not pooling the
results. Managua remains by far the largest municipality in the country
in terms of economic output and population, with its average level of
real expenditure per capita being twice the one of all other municipali-
ties in the country. The range is almost as high across all the decile of the
expenditure distribution. Results are reported in Appendices A.12–A.13.
Overall, conclusions remain unchanged.
7. Concluding remarks
The present analysis has exploited a rich dataset at both individual
and municipal levels to estimate average and distributional effects of
EPZ establishment within their host municipalities in Nicaragua for
the period 1993–2009. Evidence amassed is consistent across different
speciﬁcations and robustness checks.
Overall, I ﬁnd robust evidence that EPZ establishment in a given
municipality increased the average level of real expenditure per capita
between 10 to 12% across the period. The decomposition of the effect
across the expenditure distribution suggests that the upper-tail
beneﬁted the most both in terms of size and across time, with middle-
range deciles beneﬁting only after eight years of a zone establishment.
The exception is a small signiﬁcant effect at the 10th percentile. The
bulk of the positive effect is concentrated on the higher-skill working-
age individuals.
Data limitations do not allow me to be conclusive regarding the
ultimate channels at play here. An obvious question is why EPZs
would have mainly beneﬁtted higher-income households. Is this due
to the effect on the local cost of living, rent or land prices? Or is it the
result of the skill premium in the exporting sector? The question
remains open onwhether the effect is really due to the exporting nature
of the ﬁrms or the local dynamics on factor prices and possible
production externalities.
Theoretical models incorporating responses in land prices and rents
(Neumark and Simpson, 2014; Busso et al., 2013; Kline and Moretti,
2014), as well as labour market heterogeneity (Topalova, 2010; Kovak,
2013) seem to be the best framework to understand both possibilities.
In this sense, this paper offers some interesting insight on the
importance of analysing trade policies at the local level, taking into
account local labour market dimensions and agglomeration economies.
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2016) acknowledge the move towards this
direction, and underline the interest of the empirical literature in
inﬂuencing richer theoretical models. Findings here encourage the
honing of theoretical trade frameworks that incorporate labour market
heterogeneity in terms of skills and formality of employment, as well
different mobility patterns between low and high income segments.
The ﬁndings in this study are also important from a policy perspec-
tive. They contribute to elucidate the dynamics of a popular policy
tool, and contradict popular belief that EPZs are directly beneﬁcial for
the low-skill/low-income groups through local employment. The time
lag registered for the policy to reach different segments of the distribu-
tion leaves a door open for policy intervention. There is an urgent need
for further research in the area in order to identify with more precision
the different mechanisms at play.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.016.
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